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The Goldberg Case:
A Confirmation of the Difficulty in Acquiring Good
Title to Valuable Stolen Cultural Objects
Quentin Byrne-Sutton*
Introduction
Today's tremendous increase in the number of thefts and illegal
exports of cultural objects has raised new concern regarding the
conditions under which such property may be recovered by the
original dispossessed owners. Consequently, there has developed a
body of national and international law specifically tailored to regu-
late this question. For example, there is the well-known 1970 UN-
ESCO 'Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the
illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property',
which has been implemented by the adoption of detailed statutes in
countries such as Canada and the United States.1 Another inter-
national organization, UNIDROIT, is currently working on a 'Pre-
liminary draft convention on stolen or illegally exported cultural
objects' (hereinafter the 'UNIDROIT draft convention'), which is
being designed to complement the sometimes too general rules
contained in the foregoing UNESCO treaty with respect to the
conditions of acquisition and restitution of stolen or illegally ex-
ported cultural objects.2 These rules are, in turn, only a follow-up
to already existing particular statutes and international treaties
providing a special regime for the restitution of cultural objects
stolen or illegally exported in time of war, such as the 1954 Hague
Convention and protocol for the protection of cultural property in
the event of armed conflict.3
That said, the specifically tailored rules presently in force have
not yet been widely applied, owing in particular to the belated
ratification and implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention.4
Consequently, while awaiting the adoption of an international set
of rules which may better balance the sometimes contradictory but
legitimate interests of both free trade in and restitution of cultural
objects, national courts may seek reasonable solutions within the
scope of their common law.
It is from this point of view that the judgments recently handed
down in the Goldberg case5 are very interesting. Indeed, the courts'
analysis of both Indiana and Swiss common law6 applying to the
acquisition of stolen property demonstrates that, intelligently con-
strued, the general rules of two quite different legal systems can
* Baker and McKenzie, Geneva.
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provide adequate solutions for the need to protect dispossessed
owners of stolen cultural objects, ie despite the absence of specifically
tailored rules.
Moreover, the judgments in Goldberg are worthy of attention
because of the questions raised and solutions proposed regarding
the standing to sue for the restitution of a stolen cultural object,
and the determination of which conflict-of-law rules should apply
in establishing who is the rightful owner of such stolen property.
1 The facts
(a) The value of the cultural objects
In the case in question, one very striking aspect is the cultural and
historical importance of the objects claimed. It involves a dispute
over the ownership of four pieces of a Byzantine mosaic. These
mosaics represented figures of Jesus and the Virgin Mary bordered
on each side by two Archangels, and had been affixed to the apse of
the church of the Panagia Kanakaria in the village of Lythrankomi,
Cyprus, in 530 AD. According to the court, 'the original Kanakaria
Mosaic is one of only six or seven Byzantine mosaics to survive the
ravages of iconoclasm and the passage of time',7 and between 1959
and 1967 was cleaned and restored under the sponsorship of the
Department of Antiquities of the Republic of Cyprus, the Church
of Cyprus and Harvard University's Dumbarton Oaks Centre for
Byzantine Studies, the latter having thereafter published an author-
itative volume on the Kanakaria Church and its art.
(b) The circumstances surrounding the theft of the mosaics and
Cyprus' efforts to recover them
When the Turkish Military Forces invaded Cyprus in 1974, the north
of the island, where the church is situated, was rapidly occupied and
remains so today. The local population was soon obliged to leave
certain regions, with the result that by the end of 1976, all the
inhabitants of Lythrankomi, including the priest, had fled. From
that date on, the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus (hereinafter
the 'Church of Cyprus') had no further access to the north of the
island occupied by the Turkish forces. The Church of Cyprus first
heard of the mosaics' disappearance in 1979 from an authorized
visitor who had notified the Department of Antiquities. Therefore,
it was some time between 1976 and 1979 that the interior of the
Kanakaria Church was vandalized and the mosaics forcibly removed
at the cost of severe damage.
Upon learning that the mosaics were missing, the Republic of
Cyprus (hereinafter 'Cyprus') immediately undertook to seek their
recovery. Cyprus notified numerous institutions which it believed
could assist in disseminating information about the missing mosaics,
such as UNESCO, the International Council of Museums and Eu-
ropa Nostra, and individually informed museum curators in Europe
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and the United States, as well as the directors of large auction
houses. In particular, the Department of Antiquities went to the
trouble of writing to colleagues and specialists worldwide, as well
as addressing symposia, congresses and other such meetings in an
effort to publicize the disappearance. The Embassy of Cyprus in
Washington also acted accordingly by establishing a mailing list
containing several hundred names and sending out press-releases on
a routine basis concerning the loss of Cypriot cultural property in
general and the missing mosaics in particular. Throughout all these
efforts, special attention was paid to the need to inform the experts
and scholars who might be involved in any ultimate sale of the
mosaics. This tactic proved to be well chosen, since, in the end,
Cyprus finally discovered the whereabouts of the mosaics through
Dr Marion True of the Getty Museum in California, who had
developed a working relationship with' the Director of the Cyprus
Department of Antiquities.
(c) The circumstances surrounding Goldberg's purchase and at-
tempted resale of the mosaics
It was not before July 1988, approximately ten years after their
disappearance, that the mosaics surfaced on the market. The defend-
ant and art-dealer Peg Goldberg (President and majority shareholder
of 'Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts Inc' which apparently special-
ized in nineteenth- and twentieth-century paintings), had travelled
to Amsterdam to inspect and possibly purchase a painting by Modi-
gliani, which had been brought to her attention by Robert Fitzger-
ald, an art-dealer from Indianapolis. On 1 July, following Goldberg's
decision not to buy, Fitzgerald mentioned the mosaics for the first
time. They were being offered on sale through a Dutch art-dealer
named Michael van Rijn. The same day, Goldberg met van Rijn
and his American attorney, Ronald Faulk, in Amsterdam, and was
shown photographs of the Byzantine mosaics. She declared that she
had immediately fallen in love with, the mosaics, which were being
offered for a price of US$ 3 million.
During this meeting and the following days, these intermediaries
explained to Goldberg that the seller was a man named Aydin
Dikman, a Turkish antiques dealer, who had found the mosaics in
the rubble of an unused church in northern Cyprus while serving
as an archaeologist from. Turkey assigned to that part of the island.
According to van Rijn, the seller had been granted permission by
the Turkish Cypriot Authorities to retain the mosaics and, in the
late 1970s, to export them to Munich. Van Rijn further explained
that Dikman was in a hurry to sell because he had recently become
quite ill and had a cash problem. Goldberg did not personally know
Dikman or van Rijn, but was informed that the latter had once
been convicted in France for forging Chagall's signature and had
been sued by an art gallery for failure to pay monies.
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On the basis of the photographs and these explanations, Goldberg
asked Faulk to travel to Munich to inform the seller of her interest
in purchasing the mosaics. When Faulk returned to Amsterdam, on
2 July, he reported to Goldberg that, in his opinion, the export
documents he had seen appeared to be in order. On 3 and 4 July,
while still in Amsterdam, an agreement was prepared and signed by
Goldberg, Fitzgerald, van Rijn and Faulk providing that the mosaics
would be acquired for a purchase price of USS 1,080,000, and that
the parties would split in various proportions the profits made on
any future resale.
Thereafter, Goldberg and Fitzgerald left for Geneva to inspect
another Modigliani, whilst Dikman arranged for the shipping of the
mosaics from Munich to Geneva, by plane, on 5 July. The mosaics
never passed through the Swiss customs, but remained in the free-
port area of the Geneva airport until their shipment to the United
States on 8 July, when Goldberg returned to Indiana with the
mosaics, their sale and transfer having been finalized. After arriving
in Geneva, Goldberg met Dikman only once, briefly, at the free-
port area, during her inspection of the mosaics. In order to pay the
purchase price, Goldberg had secured financing with a bank in
Indiana, which agreed to transfer the necessary funds to Geneva on
5 July. Consequently, after her arrival in Geneva, Goldberg signed
a promissory note binding herself individually and 'Goldberg and
Feldman Fine Arts Inc' to the loan, as well as an agreement offering
the mosaics as security. It was finally on 7 July, in Geneva, that the
sum of USS 1,080,000 was handed over in 100 dollar bills to
Fitzgerald and Faulk, acting on behalf of the seller Dikman. The
same day, Dikman signed a general bill of sale, thus enabling
Goldberg immediately to travel back to the United States in posses-
sion of the mosaics.
At this stage the attempted resale of the mosaics within the United
States began. In the autumn of 1988, having offered a percentage
interest in the resale profits to further persons in Indiana, Goldberg
began a serious attempt to market and sell the mosaics, in particular
through two art-dealer acquaintances of hers. Unfortunately for
Goldberg, these two art-dealers both contacted the Getty Museum in
California, in October 1988 and January 1989, regarding a possible
purchase of the mosaics. Indeed, Marion True, of the Getty Mu-
seum, was perfectly familiar with the efforts of Cyprus to recover
the mosaics. Consequently, she informed the Department of Anti-
quities of Cyprus and the plaintiffs' Washington law firm of these
contacts, which enabled the latter quite quickly to determine the
location and possessor of the mosaics. Confronted with Golderg's
refusal to return the mosaics, the plaintiffs brought an 'action in
replevin' in Indiana in March 1989, which proceedings resulted in
the two judgments examined herein.
Before trial, the issue of money damages was separated from the
case. Thus, the only issue examined by the court in these initial
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proceedings was the question of who was entitled to possession of
the mosaics.
The District Court's judgment was made on 3 August 1989, and
the appeal judgment on 24 October 1990. Where the 'Court' is
referred to hereunder without any further indications, it implies that
the Court of Appeals simply affirmed the District Court's discussion
or decision on the point in question. Conversely, the District Court
and Court of Appeals are named in full whenever the content of
the judgment discussed differs.
2 The application of Indiana conflict-of-law rules and
substantive law
(a) The right of the Republic of Cyprus to recover
When the party claiming restitution of illegally exported or stolen
cultural property is a foreign State, one of the obstacles which has
hindered retrieval in past cases is closely related to the question of
standing. Indeed, it has been held that a sovereign State should
have no right to sue for the recovery of cultural property in a
foreign court when asserting its claim on the-basis of its own public
law, for example on a protective domestic statute attributing title
or other rights on the cultural property to the claimant-State.8
Such objection is usually justified by an old rule according to
which a court may recognize but not enforce a foreign penal, revenue
or public law. This rule is deemed to'prevent a State from exercising
its sovereignty within the jurisdiction of another when applying for
relief in front of a foreign court on .the basis of a public law to
which the claimant State has not managed to give effect itself. With
respect to public laws protecting national cultural property, this rule
would typically be asserted where a State claimed title to a cultural
object which it had never actually possessed, for example to a'n
illegally excavated and exported artefact considered to be State
property under the public law of the claimant State.
In the present case, the foregoing question could have been raised
by the Court since, formally speaking, there were two claimants of
which one was- a sovereign State: the Church of Cyprus and the
Republic of Cyprus. Despite this fact, neither Court directly exam-
ined the question.
The District Court simply points out in a footnote that the claim
of Cyprus to 'a recognized and legally cognizable interest in the
four Kanakaria mosaics, and in protecting and preserving them as
invaluable expressions of the cultural, religious and artistic heritage
of Cyprus ... is sufficient to confer standing'.9 In other words, the
District Court does not specifically examine on what legislative basis
Cyprus is relying as a party to the replevin action before the
American Courts. One might wonder whether the District Court
consciously decided to do away with any particular requirement as
to the standing of Cyprus as a foreign sovereign State. In fact, it
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seems more likely that the District Court viewed Cyprus as a form
of intervening party, acting as 'guardian' of its national cultural
patrimony, next to the Church of Cyprus actually claiming posses-
sion and restitution of the mosaics. This impression is based on the
District Court's analysis of the merits of the claim, where only the
Church of Cyprus' right to possession and property rights are
examined, and on a final remark made in the foregoing footnote,
where the District Court states: 'both the Republic and the Church
of Cyprus request that the mosaics be returned to the Church of
Cyprus. The Court has concluded that the Church of Cyprus is
entitled to possession of the mosaics. The Court need not address
further the Republic of Cyprus' standing'.10 That said, the District
Court's approach provides some indication that it sees no particular
difficulty in recognizing the standing of a foreign sovereign State
claiming cultural property on the basis of its domestic public laws
protecting such property.
(b) The Church of Cyprus's standing to sue and capacity to hold
property
When a cultural object is stolen or illegally exported from its State
of origin and sold abroad, the initial possessor may for example
have been an individual, a private or State museum, or a church.
This possessor may not, however, have been the legal owner or sole
holder of rights and interest in the cultural object. The question
therefore arises of who should be entitled to claim for the restitution
of such cultural property, ie who has standing to sue.
We have just seen how the District Court resolved the question
of Cyprus' standing in a pragmatic way, by linking the State's
interest in the mosaics with the Church of Cyprus' good title to
them.
Regarding the Church of Cyprus' standing to sue, it appeared
self-evident since the provenance of the mosaics from the Kanakaria
Church was not disputed.
Accordingly, the District Court affirmed the Church of Cyprus'
standing without any particular discussion.
However, the related question of the Church of Cyprus legal
capacity to hold property as an independent juristic person re-
mained. This question of the existence of legal capacity is normally
determined by the law of the place of domicile of the entity or
person concerned, which in the present case would be Cypriot law.
The District Court did not expressly address this question of legal
capacity. It simply stated in its discussion of the Church of Cyprus'
title that the latter could be deemed owner of the mosaics, given the
witness statements and documents produced which were sufficient
evidence of the fact that the Kanakaria Church had belonged to the
Church of Cyprus. This implicit admission of the Church of Cyprus'
legal capacity stands out as having been the correct answer in the
light of the appeal judgment. Indeed, based on a relatively detailed
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analysis of Cypriot laws, the Court of Appeals concludes that 'The
Church is recognized under and by the laws of the Republic of
Cyprus as a distinct juridical entity',11 after having in particular
cited the constitution of Cyprus as recognizing the existence of the
Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus,and granting it the 'exclusive
right of regulating and administering its own internal affairs and
property in accordance with the Holy Canons and its Charter'.12
Although the Court of Appeals actually discussed this question in
relation to an objection to its jurisdiction,(based on diversity of
citizenship), its conclusions clearly demonstrate the Church of
Cyprus' legal capacity to own and therefore claim restitution of the
mosaics.
(c) The choice of substantive law
In order to determine whether Goldberg had acquired good title
which would prevent restitution, the Court had first to establish
which substantive law was applicable to this question.
The District Court did this by comparing Indiana and Swiss
choice-of-law rules, and concluding that they both pointed to the
application of Indiana substantive law. In particular, the Court
reached this conclusion on the basis of an Indiana choice-of-law
rule commanding that the substantive law which has the 'most
significant relationship' with the cause of action be applied. Relying
on this rule, it considered Indiana to have more significant contacts
than Switzerland with the transaction conducted by Goldberg to
acquire the mosaics. However, in reaching this solution, the Court
also pointed out that the 'most significant relationship' analysis
constitutes a modification of Indiana's traditional choice-of-law rule
normally applied in what it characterized here to be a tort case.
According to this traditional rule, the law' of the place where, the
wrong was committed ('lex loci delicti commissi') should apply,
which in this case the Court had deemed to be the law of Switzerland,
where 'Goldberg, took possession of and control over the mosaics'.13
In other words, the Court concluded that precedence must be
given to Indiana substantive law, because of its more 'significant
relationship' with the transaction, over Swiss law which it would
otherwise have considered applicable as the law of 'the place where
the wrong was committed'.14
As will be shown, the Court's choice-of-law approach summarized
above was quite different from that which would probably have
been adopted by many European courts in the same circumstances.
The reasoning of the Court in Goldberg regarding choice of law is
also somewhat different from that followed in a similar case recently
judged in the United States, ie by the New York Courts in Kunst-
sammlungen zu Weimar v Elicofon ('Elicofon').15
First of all, the District Court operated in a relatively uncommon
fashion when deciding which State's choice-of-law rules should be
relied on to determine the applicable substantive law. Indeed, instead
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of simply applying the forum's conflict-of-law rules, ie those of
Indiana, Judge Noland went to the trouble of also considering Swiss
choice-of-law rules, apparently to convince himself further regarding
the proper choice of substantive law. Thus he introduces a paragraph
on Swiss choice-of-law rules by saying 'The conclusion that Indiana
substantive law applies in this case is bolstered by Swiss choice-of-
law principles'.16 This way of cumulatively taking into consideration
the choice-of-law rules of several States closely connected with the
transaction, an approach which was not adopted by the Court of
Appeals, is beyond criticism, but remains quite rare except under
the practice of arbitral tribunals.
Secondly, when applying Indiana choice-of-law rules, the Court
chose the applicable substantive law on the basis of a characteriza-
tion of the facts which is open to debate. The Court chose to
consider the replevin action as a question of tort, to which the 'lex
loci' rule traditionally applies, rather than as an action related to the
transfer of ownership which would normally be decided according to
the 'lex situs' rule (ie the law of the State where the object is situated
at the time of the alleged transfer). In this respect, the Court of
Appeals underlined its agreement with the District Court's charac-
terization, and even pointed out that the characterization might
very well have been different in front of a Swiss court: 'We note
that Goldberg claims error in Judge Noland's decision similarly to
look to tort principles, and expends a great deal of effort arguing
conflict of laws principles used in actions involving the transfer of
chattels, which is apparently how this action would be characterized
under Swiss law. As to the application of Indiana law and principles,
Goldberg's argument entirely misses the mark'.17
This characterization of the replevin action as a matter of tort is
somewhat surprising for several reasons: first of all, because when
examining the claim on the merits, the Court concentrated solely
on determining whether or not Goldberg had acquired good title to
the mosaics; secondly, because in the District Court's judgment it
is specifically stated that 'before trial, the issue of money damages
was separated from this case. Thus, the only issue presently before
court is who is entitled to possession of the mosaics'.18 Accordingly,
it is legitimate to wonder why the Court chose to characterize the
action as a question of tort. The only explanation offered by the
Court is that 'conversion, a cause of action very similar to replevin,
is a tort'.19 In this relation, it is interesting to note that in lElicofori1,
which involved a replevin action but in this case filed by an East
German Museum in an attempt to recover two works by Diirer
which were stolen at the end of the war, for the final benefit and
possession of a New York lawyer, the New York Courts charac-
terized the action as a question of ownership, rather than tort. It
was stated in particular that 'New York's choice-of-law dictates that
questions relating to the validity of a transfer of personal property
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are governed by the law of the State where the property is located
at the time of the alleged transfer'.20
The way in which the Court considered the place of occurrence
of the tort is also different from the solution adopted in 'Elicofon'.
The Court did not look to the place of the theft, .ie Cyprus,:but
to the place where Goldberg took possession of the mosaics, ie
Switzerland. Here again, this approach was probably dictated by
the analogy drawn between Goldberg's purchase and an act of
conversion. In 'Elicofori', the only possible exception to the lex situs
rule examined by the New York Court was the possibility of applying
the substantive law of Germany, ie the law of the country where
the theft had taken place rather than the law of New York where
Elicofon had purchased the Diirers.
Regarding the Court's final choice of Indiana substantive law,
as the law having 'the most significant contact' with Goldberg's
acquisition, we are not entirely convinced. Once more, it is appar-
ently the Court's perception of the nature of the transaction in
question that led to this solution. Indeed, in order to justify its
application of Indiana's substantive law instead of Swiss law, the
Court insists inter alia on .all the contacts existing between Indiana
and Goldberg's acts in relation to the envisaged resale of the mo-
saics. In other words, instead of examining which country had the
closest connection with Goldberg's actual purchase of the mosaics
(which quite clearly would have been Switzerland), the Court based
its choice on all the circumstances surrounding the transaction in a
much larger sense, ie between the time the sellers were initially
contacted in the Netherlands and Goldberg's attempt to resell the
mosaics in the United States.
In view of the foregoing, one cannot help but feel that the Court's
approach stemmed from a 'homeward trend', probably triggered in
this case by its desire to apply a more familiar substantive law which
would undoubtedly allow the replevin action to succeed.
Finally, it may be pointed out that the Court made no formal
reference to Cypriot law when examining the merits of the claim,
despite the fact that in theory Cypriot law was applicable to the
question of the Church of Cyprus' title to claim restitution. In
practice, however, the Court had no need to refer to Cypriot law
in this respect, because it was sufficient to rely on the fact that the
Church of Cyprus' previous legitimate possession was uncontested.
The Court of Appeals added that certain nationalization decrees
adopted by the Turkish Authority in northern Cyprus were confisca-
tory and contrary to the United States' public policy, and thus
unable to affect the Church of Cyprus' good title or right to
possession.
(d) The application of Indiana substantive law
As pointed out above, the Court decided that Indiana's substantive
law was in principle applicable to the question of the validity of
Goldberg's acquisition.
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Under Indiana law, the basic rule is that 'One who obtains stolen
items from a thief never obtains title to or right to possession of
the items',21 unless the original owner is time-barred by Indiana's
six-year statute of limitations. Goldberg, of course, argued that the
Church of Cyprus' cause of action first accrued in 1979 (when the
church was vandalized) and that, because the complaint was not
filed within six years thereof (ie until 1989), the plaintiffs' cause of
action was time-barred.
Unfortunately for Goldberg, it so happens that the common law
of Indiana, similarly to that of other states, contains various princi-
ples which protect the original owner from an overly strict and
mechanical application of the statute of limitations. There exists in
particular the 'doctrine of fraudulent concealment' allowing that as
a general rule 'where the chattel is fraudulently concealed... the
statute is tolled'22 and the 'rule of discovery' according to which the
statute of limitations does not begin to run 'where a plaintiff, using
due diligence, cannot bring suit because he is unable to determine
a cause of action'.23
The Court rightly decided that, in view of the circumstances, both
these principles should apply. Indeed, there is no doubt that the
Church of Cyprus, with the help of Cyprus, had diligently, but
without success until 1988, done all it could to recover possession
of the mosaics. Moreover, Dikman had concealed them, or at least
kept the mosaics off the open market throughout his possession.
The Court therefore concluded that the six-year statute of limitations
only began to run in 1988, and that the mosaics must be returned
to their previous possessor and owner, the Church of Cyprus.
Beyond the result, which, given the circumstances, brooks no
criticism, it is the appropriateness of the common-law rules applied
which deserve attention. Indeed, it is often pointed out that the
possibility of concealing a precious work of art during the statute
of limitations period, together with the gradual 'laundering' effect
of multiple transactions across international borders, is an effective
method for eliminating the original owner's right to claim restitu-
tion. Accordingly, the foregoing solutions adopted by the Indiana
Courts regarding when a cause of action accrues, represent an
efficient response to this real problem: in order to exclude the risk
of a claim for restitution, dishonest or negligent possessors cannot
simply rely on moving artefacts from concealment to bank-vaults.
The solutions adopted further help to account for the interest that
cultural objects not be stored forever in museum basements, since
a museum that wishes to legitimize its possession of an object has
a duty to show it. On the other hand, properly construed, the
principles applied in this case should not unduly favour dispossessed
owners, because they have the duty diligently and continuously to
seek out the stolen cultural property.
Finally, it is interesting to note that the solutions reached by the
Court, relying on Indiana common-law, are quite similar to those
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embodied in various rules specially tailored for the issue of restitu-
tion raised by illegal trafficking in cultural objects. For example,
the UNIDROIT draft convention provides under its Article 3 that
'any claim for the restitution of a stolen cultural object shall be
brought within a period of 3 years from the time when the claimant
knew or ought reasonably to have known the location or the identity
of the possessor of the object',24 and the recently enacted United
States' 'Convention on cultural property implementation Act' pro-
vides for statutes of limitations of variable lengths, which apply
according to the means and degree of publicity through which
the purchaser in good faith of stolen cultural objects reveals his
acquisition and possession.25
3 The application of Swiss conflict-of-law rules and substantive
law
(a) The analysis of Swiss conflict-of-law rules
As briefly pointed out earlier, the District Court tried to reinforce
its argumentation by referring not only to the forum's choice-of-
law rules (ie Indiana's) , but also to those of the place where a large
part of the transaction took place, ie Switzerland. Although this
approach is, in itself, perfectly acceptable, not to say desirable in
certain circumstances, we are not entirely convinced by the Court's
conclusions regarding the content of the relevant Swiss rules.
The District Court's reasoning is nevertheless interesting because
it raises an important question which often appears in the context
of illegal trafficking in cultural objects: where an artefact is in the
process of being transported through several countries at the mo-
ment of its sale, should one admit an exception to the basic rule
according to which transfer of ownership is governed by the law of
the state where the object is situated at the time of the alleged
transfer, ie to the 'lex situs' rule?26
It is uncontested in Switzerland, as in many other countries, that
if an object is 'in transit', the law of the place of destination
exceptionally applies instead of the law of the situs.27 Accordingly,
the real difficulty and controversy on this subject stems from the
determination of when an object may be deemed to be in transit. It
is on this point that the District Court's reasoning is open to
criticism.
The District Court relies essentially on testimonial evidence from
Professor A von Mehren, to argue that the mosaics must be charac-
terized as 'in transit' from a Swiss point of view, considering the
circumstances surrounding their transport through Switzerland. In
this relation, the District Court stresses in particular that 'upon
their arrival in Geneva, the mosaics were placed in storage in the
free-port area of the Geneva airport; there they remained in storage
for four days until being shipped to Indianapolis. The mosaics never
passed through Swiss customs. The mosaics never entered the Swiss
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stream of commerce. Their presence in Switzerland was temporary,
as was intended. Those involved with the transaction intended that
if the sale was consummated, the mosaics were to be shipped to
Indiana; if not, the mosaics were to be returned to Germany'.28
The District Court's foregoing presentation of the facts does not
sufficiently account for one of the main purposes of an exception
to the 'lex situs' rule where goods are 'in transit'. This purpose is
to enable the determination of an applicable law even though the
precise location of the object at the time of the transaction is
unknown.29 In the present case, the mosaics remained in Switzerland
throughout the sales operation, ie in particular during their inspec-
tion, the payment, the drafting of the bill-of-sale and the transfer
of possession, all these acts having moreover been performed entirely
in Switzerland. The placing of the mosaics in storage in the free-
port area during this operation is not in itself a deciding factor,
since the non-passage of the customs does not as such prevent the
existence of Swiss jurisdiction over the mosaics, in the country where
they were physically situated after crossing its territorial borders.
Consequently, even if the links between Switzerland and the transac-
tion on the mosaics were relatively transitory, they were at the same
time quite intense and certainly not truly fortuitous. It is therefore
our opinion that the District Court's characterization of the mosaics
as having been 'in transit' at the time of the sale was somewhat
hasty.
One may understand the District Court's feeling that Switzer-
land's legal system was not particularly concerned by a transaction
between a Turkish seller and an American buyer, the latter intending
above all to return to the United States with the mosaics. Neverthe-
less, if such was the District Court's impression, it should not have
reasoned in terms of goods 'in transit', but rather have applied the
statutory rule according to which the normally applicable law may
be disregarded 'if, under the entire circumstances, it is obvious that
the facts only have a remote connection to that law and a much
closer connection to another law'.30 Even on this basis, it is impro-
bable that the substantive law of Indiana should have been applied
in lieu of Swiss substantive law, since as far as the purchase of the
mosaics by Goldberg is concerned (ie independently of her desire
to resell the mosaics in the United States), it appears that Switzerland
was the more likely 'centre of gravity' of that transaction.
(b) The application of Swiss substantive law
As already mentioned, in order to overcome any possible criticism
of its choice of Indiana substantive law, the District Court also
analyzed the dispute under Swiss substantive law 'assuming, ar-
guendo, that Indiana's substantive law does not apply'.31
The District Court again relied primarily on testimonial evidence
from Professor A von Mehren regarding the content of Swiss law.
This evidence summarized the conditions under which good title to
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stolen objects could be obtained, ie in particular the requirement of
good faith and the existence of a legal presumption of good faith.
What is most interesting in von Mehren's testimony, as well as
in the District Court's analysis, is their insistence on the importance
of the entire circumstances surrounding the transaction for the
determination of good faith, and the higher standard of diligence
which must be expected from a purchaser of cultural objects of
great value.
Both von Mehren, and the District Court through him, reason in
accordance with the Swiss Supreme Court's precedents holding that
'whenever the circumstances raise doubts as to the quality of the
seller, the purchaser may no longer content himself with the mere
appearance constituted by possession; the purchaser must enquire
into the seller's capacity to convey property right'.32
In this relation, von Mehren and the District Court rightly insist
on the particular diligence with which a purchaser must proceed
when clearly extremely valuable cultural objects are involved. They
state: 'the very nature of the items for sale warranted that a potential
purchaser should proceed with caution... these objects are not
ordinary commercial objects. They are objects that have religious
and cultural significance. They are the kind of objects that do not
ordinarily enter into commerce, and here they are in commerce, or
being offered for sale. A careful and honest purchaser would have
to understand and explain why... these mosaics should now be
offered on the market'.33
The District Court then proceeds to detail the numerous facts
which should have made Goldberg suspicious, including particularly
the initially immovable nature of the mosaics, the very low purchase
price, the lack of information regarding the seller Dikman whom
Goldberg met only once, the lack of any documents establishing
Dikman's good title, the dubious reputation of various intermediar-
ies, as well as the extreme speed with which the whole transaction
took place. The District Court concludes in this respect that 'the
Court cannot improve on Dr. Vican's summary of the suspicious
circumstances surrounding this sale: 'all the red flags are up, all the
red lights are on, all the sirens are blaring...'.'34
The District Court points out that in such circumstances, Gold-
berg could not content herself with the appearance of peaceful
possession by Dikman, but, on the contrary, should have indulged
in a serious enquiry regarding the history of the mosaics. In this
connection, the District Court refers to the fact that Goldberg did
not consult any experts on Byzantine Art and never contacted the
Cypriot authorities, and insists further that Goldberg showed no
good evidence that she had consulted institutions such as IFAR or
INTERPOL which keep stolen-art registers. Goldberg's claim to
good faith is therefore rejected by the District Court, and her
acquisition of good title on the basis of Article 934 of the Swiss
Civil Code excluded.
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The foregoing argumentation of the District Court is important
in two respects. First of all, it demonstrates that a proper application
of the general rules of Swiss law relating to acquisition in good
faith leaves room for the need to provide special protection for
dispossessed owners of stolen cultural objects of great value. One
may note that the appropriateness of Swiss law in this respect was
also recently remarked on by a leading commentator in this field of
art law, Mr A L Droz, according to whom 'it seems that the principle
which prevails in certain law systems whereby good faith is always
presumed is excessive where the purchase of works of art is involved,
which, by their very nature, should trigger a specially diligent ap-
proach. Without, of course, going so far as to presume a purchaser's
bad faith, it would appear necessary to systematically rely on the
rule provided, for example, under Article 3 Paragraph 2 of the Swiss
Civil Code which states that 'no person can plead bona fides in any
case where he has failed to exercise the degree of care required by
the circumstances'.35
Secondly, in demonstrating the adequacy of Swiss law, the District
Court highlights the necessity that the purchaser pay special atten-
tion, considering the artistic, cultural and often economic value of
the objects in question, which require more diligence and expert
knowledge from the buyer. Here again, one may quote Mr Droz's
view that 'it will have to be generally recognized one day that, with
respect to the circulation of works of art and cultural objects, the
persons involved will need to respect rules of conduct to be estab-
lished, and that it shall be normal to require that they prove they
have respected such rules. The more value a work of art or cultural
object has, whether it is economic, artistic, historical, religious, etc,
the more these rules of conduct should be stringent. We consider
that the character of the purchaser must be taken into consideration,
and that it is normal to expect more from professionals, antique
dealers or museum curators. One can be in good faith, but neverthe-
less responsible for not having taken the necessary precautions
(requirement of certificates of origin, export licences, etc), and this
negligence must, in certain cases, result in the obligation to return
the object without indemnity'.36
The latter part of Mr Droz's remark is also very important,
because he stresses the idea that it is not so much the honesty of
dealers in such objects which is at stake, but simply their capacity
to act more diligently. This concern echoes that of the Court of
Appeals, which states, in this relation, that 'unfortunately, when
these mosaics surfaced, they were in the hands not of the most
guilty parties but of Peg Goldberg and her gallery... Lest the results
seem too harsh, we should note that those who wish to purchase
art work on the international market, undoubtedly a ticklish busi-
ness, are not without means by which to protect themselves. Es-
pecially when circumstances are as suspicious as those that faced
Peg Goldberg, prospective purchasers would do best to do more
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than make a few last-minute phone calls... In such cases, dealers
can (and probably should) take steps such as a formal IFAR search;
a documented authenticity check by disinterested experts; a full
background search of the seller and his claim of title; insurance
protection and a contingency sales contract; and the like. Had
Goldberg pursued such methods, perhaps she would have discovered
in time what she now has discovered too late: the Church of Cyprus
has a valid, superior and enforceable claim to these Byzantine
treasures, which therefore must be returned to it'.37
This passage of the judgment is further noteworthy because it
underlines the existence of stolen art registers, as well as the negative
incidence which their non-consultation can have on the purchaser's
proof of diligence. The importance of these registers was not over-
looked by the experts having prepared the UNIDROIT draft con-
vention, since its Article 4, Paragraph 2, expressly establishes the
consultation of specialized registers as one criterion of appreciation
of the purchaser's good faith in the following terms: 'in determining
whether the possessor exercised such diligence, regard shall be had
to the relevant circumstances of the acquisition, including the char-
acter of the parties and the price paid, and whether the possessor
consulted any accessible register of stolen cultural objects which it
could have consulted'.38
This duty of consultation is all the more meaningful given the
recent constitution of several comprehensive art-theft computer
registers, ie databases which are being loaded with information
regarding stolen and illegally exported works of art and cultural
objects.39 These registers are in the process of becoming operational
and allow dealers, museums and private owners to register their
possessions or consult the database according to their needs. The
existence of these registers should, however, not only give rise to a
duty of consultation whenever the circumstances surrounding a
purchase are suspicious, but also to a reciprocal duty for dispos-
sessed owners, whenever possible, diligently to publicize their loss.
Conclusion
It has become commonplace to state that, with respect to trade in
cultural objects of great value, there are many conflicting but legit-
imate interests which need to be accommodated when determining
whether an illegally exported or stolen object must remain in the
hands of a good-faith purchaser or be returned to the dispossessed
owner. The complex pattern of interests involved often makes such
choice difficult and has given rise to a passionate controversy over
the past decades between those defending the preservation of
national cultural patrimonies and those defending the free circula-
tion of cultural objects.
Within the context of this controversy, the circumstances of the
Goldberg case are interesting because they probably represent a
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situation where a large majority would agree that restitution was
the right solution, i.e where a stolen, very valuable and originally
immovable cultural object is involved. In particular, the Goldberg
decision demonstrates that, even under common law, good title to
such objects may practically never be acquired, except where the
original owner shows no interest in retrieving his property or an
extremely long period of time has elapsed. The Court in Goldberg
has the great merit of making this clear by examining in much detail
all the circumstances surrounding the theft and purchase of the
mosaics, and by stating its opinion without circumspection regarding
the particular duties a buyer of valuable cultural objects is bound
to respect.
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